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“Pattern of Meaning”:
Symbolic Dynamism as a Formal Structure in The Waste Land and The Well Wrought Urn
Jane Forsyth
Cleanth Brooks’ The Well Wrought Urn is his most famous work, and for good reason.
His principles of paradox, drama, and organic unity became pillars of the New Critical
movement, and his co-authored texts, Understanding Poetry and Understanding Fiction, forever
changed the way literature is taught. Even in decades which reacted against the New Critical
school, the practice of close-reading which Brooks and his colleagues championed continued to
be an essential component of poetic reading. Brooks’ 1937 reading of The Waste Land suggests
ways in which that poem shaped his poetics and helps us to better understand the ramifications
of those principles. Thus, my focus will remain on Brooks’ interpretation of The Waste Land,
rather than on the poem itself. Ultimately, by considering the shared interests of modern art
and poetry, Brook’s poetic theory can be seen as distinctively modernist in its expanded notion
of form.
I would like to begin by briefly considering the shared interests of modern art and
poetry to better understand Brooks’ idea of poetic form. Brooks’ poetic theory is distinctively
modernist in its expanded notion of form, which emphasizes the structural physicality of the
poem. Finally, the paper considers the relevance of Brooks’ poetics to contemporary poetry.
Brooks’ analysis of The Waste Land seeks to extoll the formal unity of the poem. The
poem, he says, has been “almost consistently misinterpreted since its first publication” because
people fail to understand “Eliot’s technique” (“Analysis” 206). While the poem appears
formless, like a collection “of material apparently accidentally thrown together” (“Analysis”

208), Brooks argues that the poem is the product of a clear, albeit unusual, “method of
organization” (185) and composition (206). The purpose of his essay is to “better understand
why the form of the poem is right and inevitable” (209, emphasis added). Brooks’ emphasis on
the formal unity of the work pitted him against many of his contemporary critics and therefore
demonstrates the novelty of his evolving notion of poetic form.
John Crowe Ransom was a major critic of The Waste Land. His scathing review of the
poem, “Waste Lands,” published in 1923 in the New York Evening Post Literary Review,
criticized Eliot’s poetic immaturity for producing such a “disconnected” work whose many
parts, meters, tongues, and genres create a “bewildering wilderness” rather than the “fusing
[of] its elements” essential to a poem (167-8). Ransom ends by declaring the poem “one of the
most insubordinate poems in the language” and one unlikely to stand the test of time (170).
Over a decade later, Ransom persisted in declaring The Waste Land formally “insubordinate,”
this time putting the poem in conversation with Lycidas. Ransom says that in Lycidas the
young Milton took “liberties” with “the historic metrical pattern already before them” (Ransom
6) and thereby the poem “tends habitually towards the formlessness which is modern”
(Ransom 7). Importantly, Ransom here identifies modern poetry generally (and The Waste
Land in particular) as “formless.” For Ransom, then, poetic form is fundamentally a matter of
rhythm, meter, rhyme, imagery, and genre, the mediating structures and rituals to which the
poet’s initial driving emotion or experience is subverted. A poem that evades these poetic
norms is not, in fact, a poem -- or at least not a good one. If Milton’s Lycidas does not quite
devolve into total formlessness, according to Ransom, Eliot’s The Waste Land certainly does.

Brooks probably would not disagree with Ransom’s emphasis on poetic form, repeatedly
asserting “the primacy of the pattern” (Urn 194) in the writing and therefore the interpretation
of poetry. But he would disagree about the nature of poetic form: rhyme, meter, and the like
are--for Brooks--only elements of form. Poetic form itself is something other: it is “a structure
of meanings, evaluations, and interpretations” (Urn 195). These meanings are conveyed
primarily through the images or symbols which the poet employs. Brooks calls the symbol the
“the sole linguistic vehicle which conveys the things communicated accurately” (Urn 4). And for
Brooks, this structure of symbolic meanings is “the principle of unity” which makes the
disparate elements of a poem truly one by “balancing and harmonizing connotations, attitudes,
and meanings” (Urn 195). An example is his reading of Herrick’s “Corinna’s going a-Maying.”
He traces the poet’s use of “dew” and “dew drops” throughout the poem, concluding that “in
the context of the poem they become a symbol heavily charged with meaning which no
dictionary can be expected to give” (Urn 73). While the poem is open to a more traditional
formal reading, Brooks argues that what truly orders and unifies it, and the most important
means by which the poem communicates, is the way the image of the “dew” acquires meaning,
becoming a symbol which stands for what the poem “means.”
This idea that symbolic accretion of meaning is the unifying poetic principle is something
Brooks seems to have learned from The Waste Land. In his reading of the poem, Brooks
repeatedly notes how symbols, like characters, “mel[t] into each other” (“Analysis” 208).
Brooks’ useful term for the process by which Eliot revisits particular words or images or phrases
throughout the poem is “recapitulation of symbols” (“Analysis” 197). And here is the origin of
two other pillars of Brooks’ poetics: poetry as dramatic action, and poetry as something sub

specie aeternitatis. In the poem, Brooks notes, each symbol does not have “one, unequivocal
meaning” which would produce a “didactic allegory” – and a two-dimensional, static one at
that. Rather, symbols are things in motion – “dramatized instances of the theme” (“Analysis”
209).
Brooks’ idea of poetry-as-drama stems from an attention to poetry’s temporality. In The
Well Wrought Urn, Brooks compares poetry to music insofar as each is “a pattern of resolutions
and balances and harmonizations, developed through a temporal scheme” (203). But he moves
away from this analogy because music is not intellectual the way poetry is – it does not “mak[e]
use of words” (Urn 204). He seizes upon drama as the best comparison partly to address the
heresy of paraphrase which so often corrupts the integrity of a poem. Despite its use of words,
drama is more easily regarded “as an action rather than as a formula for action or as a
statement about action” (Urn 204, emphasis original) which combats the tendency to
paraphrase it in terms of the “ideas” it contains. But the similarity between the two genres
runs deeper than that: for Brooks they share the same fundamental elements or, as he says,
“structure:” each is “something which arrives at its conclusion through conflict” (Urn 204).
Formally, both are things-acted-out in and through time.
What is particularly interesting about Brooks’ idea of poetic drama or dynamism is that
it happens on the micro-level. Naturally, poems move through time as some sort of narration;
even lyric poetry turns the emotion of a moment into something extended in time. But Brooks
sees a smaller or more local dynamism within the dramatic structure in the way that symbols
accrue significance over the course of the poem. These internal dynamics are, for Brooks, the
fundamental structural elements of poetic form and poetic unity.

Brooks’ discussion of symbolic dynamism resonates with William Empson’s extended
discussions of the ways in which denotations and connotations of a word act upon one another
and the reader to create the nexus of meaning which is the poem. One of Empson’s most
clarifying examples comes in his discussion of the second type of ambiguity, where ambiguities
function to produce meaning “as two forces almost in the same line may have a small resultant
in quite another direction” (Empson 95). Implicit in this comparison is a claim that ambiguities
work like force vectors: just as forces pulling in different directions propel an object in its actual
path of motion, so ambiguities push a line, poem, or image towards the total meaning which is
the resultant of those individual tensions and cooperations. The second type of ambiguity has
this strange opposite-direction-resultant: sometimes forces which seem to be tending in one
direction can also have an effect in the opposite direction. This sounds like what Brooks would
call the “principle of poetic paradox.”
This term recurs throughout The Well Wrought Urn, and Brooks’ sensitivity to its
importance springs from how he reads The Waste Land. Brooks sees contrast or paradox as
Eliot’s distinctive device and the foundation on which The Waste Land is built: “The basic
method used in The Waste Land may be described as the application of the principle of
complexity. The poet works in terms of surface parallelisms which in reality make ironical
contrasts, and in terms of surface contrasts which in reality constitute parallelisms” (“Analysis”
206-207). Brooks takes as an example Madame Sosostris and the “surace irony” between “the
original use of the Tarot cards and the use made here” as “each of the details...assumes a new”
– and we might add, a true – meaning in the general context of the poem: “the ‘fortune-telling’
which is taken ironically by a twentieth-century audience becomes true as the poem develops –

true in a sense in which Madame Sosostris herself does not think it true” (207, emphasis
original).
Brooks praises this method because it is “honest” (“Analysis” 209). Paradox and
symbolic dynamism are, for Brooks, essential components of poetry because they are
components of life: “This complication of parallelisms and contrasts makes, of course, for
ambiguity; but the ambiguity, in part, resides in the poet’s fidelity to the complexity of
experience” (“Analysis” 208). Brooks says that, in the Madame Sosostris scene, “all the central
symbols of the poem head up here, but here, in the only section in which they are explicitly
bound together, the binding is slight and accidental. The deeper lines of association only
emerge in terms of the total context as the poem develops” (“Analysis” 207). Experience
supports this as being “true to life:” the true significance of an event is seen only after the fact,
as it begins to develop relationships to other events over time. So too in the poem. The symbol
only acquires meaning in virtue of the many positions it occupies – or the roles it plays – and in
each role there are resonances of prior and future roles, prior and future tensions which may or
may not conflict with those of the present. “In this way,” says Brooks, “the statement of beliefs
emerges through confusion and cynicism – not in spite of them” (“Analysis” 210).
It is important to Brooks that the gradual accretion and manifestation of meaning is
something chosen, a matter of poetic craft: “this is, of course, exactly the effect which the poet
intends” (“Analysis” 207). In Understanding Poetry, Brooks and Warren say that “the poetic
effect depends not on the things themselves but on the kind of use the poet makes of them”
(xlixx). This idea is, of course, not in itself new or distinctive. But Brooks’ particular articulation
of it is distinctive, and suggests the influence of Eliot and The Waste Land. The above comment

closes Brooks’ and Warren’s rebuttal to one of the three misconceptions about what poetry is.
They are responding to the idea of poetry as a “beautiful statement of some high truth” which
treats poetry as a “sugar-coated pill,” as truth masked by various kinds of beauty. In their
rebuttal, Brooks and Warren offer an excerpt of a speech from Hamlet: “none of the things
used in this passage would be thought of as being pleasing in itself in actual life” (xlixx). What
makes the passage beautiful or poetic is the arrangement of these things, the ordering of the
disparate parts, by the poet-maker. Brooks and Warren argue that this extreme case
exemplifies what is really going on in all poetic making: poetry depends on “the kind of use the
poet makes” of the things at his disposal. In this way, the poet is a collage artist: he places preexisting things together in a new way. This idea resonates with Eliot’s description of his own
poem as “a heap of broken images” and as “fragments shored up against my ruin.” In The Well
Wrought Urn, Brooks claims that the poet, unlike the scientist, “has to make up his language as
he goes” (9) and Brooks further invokes Eliot: “T.S. Eliot has commented upon ‘that perpetual
slight alteration of language, words perpetually juxtaposed in new and sudden combinations’
which occurs in poetry” (9). This Modernist idea of collage is not really a new conception of
poetry so much as it is a refocusing on a particular, sometimes overlooked, quality of poetry
and poetic making. The poet takes things – words, images, rhythms – and places them side by
side. They are things in their own right, but when an artist places them together, words and
images and rhythms exert their forces with, off, and against each other; a little drama of
meaning unfolds. And this drama is the sign of a new integral life: the fragmented constituent
parts become an organic whole.

One of the major themes of The Waste Land is vitality, both in terms of sexuality and
symbolic meaning. It is closely bound up with what Brooks calls the central paradox of the
poem, that “life devoid of meaning is death; sacrifice, even the sacrificial death, may be lifegiving, an awakening to life” (“Analysis” 186). The link between these ideas (sexuality, life-anddeath, and symbolic meaning) is the myth of the Fisher King which Brooks notes is about
physical and spiritual sterility: first, “the crops do not grow, and the animals cannot reproduce”
because “the Fisher King...has been rendered impotent”; second, “the curse can only be
removed by the appearance of a knight who will ask the meanings of the various symbols which
are displayed to him in the castle” (“Analysis” 186). The implication is that the meaning of
these symbols is somehow locked up, inaccessible. “Asking the meaning” is a way of activating
or liberating these symbols, of releasing their internal forces to interact among one another.
There is also a suggestion that these symbols have something to do with the history of the land,
since these are the kinds of images usually found inside castles. For Eliot, the modern world
has one major problem – isolation – which is manifested in two particular ways: first, sexual
isolation, impotence, and unfruitfulness; and second, temporal isolation in the “now” which
destroys the power of symbols to mean. Examining how Brooks reads the interrelation of these
two forms of isolation in The Waste Land provides understanding for how his poetic theory is
rooted in this poem.
Brooks reads the opening sentences of the poem as Eliot colliding those two concerns in
one image. “The Burial of the Dead” begins by offering a paradoxical image of life-in-death and
of death-in-life: the plants are growing from the ground in which the dead have been buried,
but that growing is ugly, deathlike, cruel, cold. This complex image involves the question of

symbolic meaning because the growth of plants entails “memory:” the roots reach down to the
graves of the ancestors and spring melts away the “warm” “forgetfulness” of winter snow. Loss
of symbolic meaning, it is suggested, has to do with humans being cut off from the past, and is
tied up both with isolation and sexuality. Plants cannot bear fruit unless their roots run deep.
Sexuality involves the surrender of the self; life only comes through a kind of death. The
interplay between symbols is sexual insofar as it is (or should be) generative of new beings, new
meanings (see “Analysis” 187-192). Brooks reads the poem as a kind of metapoetics: it is about
the process of making poetry and about its potential power to enable human participation in
eternity through the resurrection and revitalization of symbols. For the hero to “ask the
meaning of the symbols” is to engender new meanings, to engage in something sexually
fruitful. Brooks traces how the poem’s symbols work out this problem. The “corpse” planted in
the garden becomes an ancient fertility god and the Phoenician sailor drowned at sea. The
images coalesce in Section V:
The awful daring of a moment’s surrender
Which an age of prudence can never retract
By this, and this only, we have existed
Which is not to be found in our obituaries
Or in memories draped by the beneficent spider
Or under seals broken by the lean solicitor
In our empty rooms.
The moment of sexual intimacy collides with “obituaries,” which makes the reader anticipate
“tombs” instead of “rooms.” And yet, for Brooks, the poem suggests that this burial through
the life-in-death of sexuality will bring the rain (“Analysis” 204).
The poet is, in the end, implicated as the hero who can return understanding and vitality
to the symbols (“I sat upon the shore / Fishing, with the arid plain behind me / Shall I at least

set my lands in order?”) because for Eliot, the process of making poetry is “a continual
surrender of himself as he [the poet] is at the moment to something which is more valuable”
(Wood 30). The hero can save the land through a paradoxical submission to life-in-death,
death-in-life through sexual surrender. The poet saves the possibility of poetic symbolism by
paradoxically killing the possibility of poetic meaning so as to revivify the “heap of broken
images” so they can be unified and take on a life of their own: “‘That corpse you planted last
year in your garden, / Has it begun to sprout?’” Brooks sees The Waste Land as an exemplary
image of the reviving process that is poetry: the poet repurposes signs not to subvert their
original meaning, but to allow them to mean their same meaning in a new way.
This mode by which poets speak is what Brooks calls in a much later work “indirect
speech” (God 71). For Brooks, poetry is essentially sacramental because it is a way of conveying
to the uninitiated the “visions” or experiences of the poet, the seer, the see-er of higher things:
“Eliot’s poetry, from the very beginning, is conceived in terms of the following problem: how is
revealed truth to be mediated to the Gentiles? How is that which is by definition ineffable to
be translated into words, no direct transmission of the vision being possible?” (God 71). This is
what Brooks had in mind when, in the Preface to The Well-Wrought Urn, he describes poetry
not so much as “an expression of its age” but rather as “sub specie aeternitatis” (x). While he
sees this in Eliot, Brooks is making a claim about poetry itself. For all its use of words, poetry in
some way is not about words. This is yet another reason paraphrase is impossible. Poetry is
about conveying the “ineffable” – the unsayable, that which the poet has seen and which by its
nature is beyond articulation in language. The problem of poetry is to convey this vision

through, as Stevens puts it, “ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds” (“The Idea of Order at Key
West”).
Poetic language, then, is a different kind of thing than scientific language – so different
as to be untranslatable or unparaphrasable. Brooks reads “A Game of Chess” as a commentary
on modern abstraction. In his analysis, he quotes a lengthy passage from Allen Tate’s
commentary on this section, in which Tate focuses on the disjunction between the lush
descriptions which open the scene and the stale, detached conversation of the second part:
“The rich experience of the great tradition depicted in the room receives a violent shock in
contrast with a game that symbolizes the inhuman abstraction of the modern mind” (qtd in
Brooks, “Analysis”192). This scene, says Brooks, presents a life that is meaningless in itself;
meaning is derived only from “the abstract game which they are to play, a game in which the
meaning is assigned and arbitrary, meaning by convention only – in short, a game of chess”
(192). This idea of “assigned” and “arbitrary” meaning is important both as a commentary on
the modern age, which it clearly is, but also as a reaction against certain ideas of poetry. If
meanings are “assigned” and “arbitrary,” poems are easy enough to understand and to
paraphrase: one needs only the right key to unlock the encoded meanings. Eliot’s poem
challenges the reader to attempt such an approach (the footnotes are particularly misleading in
this regard) and then deliberately thwarts all attempts to do so. Poems understood this way
lack the organic force which allows language to develop and evolve to fit the changing
experiences of humans; poetry is forever “dead” because it possesses no integral unity, no
organic power.

But poetry, for Brooks as for Eliot, is not dead – or at least is not permanently dead.
These ideas are crystalized in the image of poetry-as-urn which recurs throughout The Well
Wrought Urn. The first passage devoted to this image bears quoting in its entirety:
The urn to which we are summoned, the urn which holds the ashes of the phoenix, is
like the well-wrought urn of Donne’s “Canonization” which holds the phoenix-lovers’
ashes: it is the poem itself… But there is a sense in which all such well-wrought urns
contain the ashes of a Phoenix. The urns are not meant for memorial purposes only,
though that often seems to be their chief significance to the professors of literature.
The phoenix rises from its ashes; or it ought to rise; but it will not arise for all our mere
sifting and measuring the ashes, or testing them for their chemical content. We must be
prepared to accept the paradox of the imagination itself; else ‘Beautie, Truth, and
Raritie’ remain enclosed in their cinders and we shall end with essential cinders, for all
our pains (20-21).
In many ways, Brooks’ use of the urn as the symbol for poetry is strange and unexpected. He
dwells at such length on the intellectual and imaginative components of poetry as he discusses
poetic symbolism and the heresy of paraphrase and the centrality of paradox that this kind of
tactile, material image catches us by surprise. But it should not.
Urns, of course, have two purposes: they hold things (Brooks highlights the ashes of the
dead), and they are (usually) aesthetically ornate. Urns, then, are things we view rather than
read. Brooks has described poetic form as a “structure”and a “pattern,” comparing it to
architecture and painting (Urn 203) even before comparing it to music or drama. Thus, Brooks
is expanding the idea of poetic form to incorporate the physicality of the poem. This interest in
the visual component of poetic form is in fact of wider interest in the modern period. In her
introduction to The Harvard Book of Contemporary American Poetry, Helen Vendler writes that
while we more frequently think of poetry as an oral art, thinking of its origins, with the rise of
modern poetry, “against the ear, the eye makes its case” (1). She is speaking about later poets

than Eliot – Berryman, Ammons, Lowell, all contemporaries of Brooks, in fact – but her
comments identify a strain of continuity between Eliot, Brooks, and these later poets. She
continues, “the eye makes its case – for the jagged edges of a Berryman dream song, for the
minimalist shapeliness of an Ammons stanza, for the weighty block of a Lowell sonnet. These
signs of writing construct poetry, too; and the play of light and shadow in the text – now a
haunting voice, now a calligraphic curve – awakens part of the nameless happiness of reading”
(Vendler 1). These moves by poets were meant as innovations certainly, but they were also
attempts at continuity. William Carlos Williams articulated their paradoxical position in Spring
and All: “Today where everything is being brought into sight the realism of art has bewildered
us, confused us and forced us to re-invent in order to retain that which the older generations
had without that effort (Collected 198). The innovations of modern poetry angle both at
novelty and tradition. Recalling that poetry is a written sign, it is not so surprising that poets
and critics would be interested in how its shape, the physical space it occupies, is part of its
aesthetic form – that is, as a formal structural element by which it means. Modernist poetry
asks us to attend to the eye rather than the ear – or rather, to attend to the ear through the
eye.
Attending then, to the eye, unpacks the significance of Brooks’ chosen image of the urn
as a symbol for poetry. An urn is visually pleasing and expressive if it is painted, but even its
silhouette, the line it makes against its context, is aesthetic and serves as an important symbol
of poetry. It moves through space, designating a “this and not that,” demarking a space
contained and a space excluded: creating, in fact, a place. This idea of poem-as-place within
which things happen (or are poised to happen) is another valence of Brooks’ urn symbol. The

poem is the structure within which the drama of symbolic resurrection occurs, but only when
rightly read. To Brooks, “wrong” reading attends to the “chemical content” (the constituent
parts of a poem: rhyme, meter, rhythm) by “sifting...measuring...testing” – by scientific
processes. The problem with this approach is that it treats poetry as translation, as discussed
above. This approach makes the reader look for “logical coherences where they are sometimes
irrelevant” and fail “to see imaginative coherences on levels where they are highly relevant”
(Urn 202). For right reading ultimately requires accepting “the paradox of the imagination”
(Urn 21).
In order to understand what Brooks means by this phrase, it is helpful to look at
Coleridge, whose ideas about the imagination influenced him as they did his colleague Robert
Penn Warren. In a famously obscure passage in Biographia Literaria, Coleridge describes the
imagination as a creative power, closely related to the power of “human perception,” and
either a “repetition” or an “echo” of “the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM” (244). Its
activity is to “re-create” the world by a process of “dissolv[ing], diffus[ing], dissipat[ing]”, ever
“struggl[ing] to idealize and to unify” (244). It is a “vital” process; the objects it employs are
themselves “essentially fixed and dead,” but through the activity of the imagination are recreated or, to use Brooks’ word, resurrected.
The imagination is paradoxical, then, because of its relationship with the real. Poetry,
says Coleridge, imbues the “common view” of the world with “ideal” qualities (240). This
allows poetry to perform a kind of phoenix-esque resurrection: “the most admitted truths” are
so widely accepted “that they lose all the life and efficiency of truth, and lie bed-ridden in the
dormitory of the soul,” and the poetic imagination “rescues” them “from the impotence

caused by the very circumstances of their universal admission” (Coleridge 241). In other words,
the poetic imagination reveals the real by reframing truth in such a way that it is no longer
passively accepted: there is now an element of struggle involved. From this concept, Robert
Penn Warren pulls his idea of poetic tension. Poetry, for Warren, ought to be impure by
including within itself conflicting elements: poetic structure must involve “resistances” (Warren,
“Pure” 24). Warren argues that, for Coleridge, the poem instantiates “the necessary tension
between the ideal [poetry] and the real [the poem], the abstract [poetry] and the relative [the
poem]” which in fact, as Charlotte Beck so accurately puts it, lies at the heart of Warren’s own
“poetics of (im)purity” (Beck 328).
Brooks argues for something similar in his concluding chapter in The Well Wrought Urn:
“whatever statement we may seize upon as incorporating the ‘meaning’ of the poem,
immediately the imagery and the rhythm seem to set up tensions with it, warping and twisting
it, qualifying and revising it” (197). In other words, the traditional aspects of form always are a
force in tension with the “meaning” of the poem. This, for Brooks, is not distinctive of
Modernism, though it is a quality of Modernist poetry in a new way. According to Brooks, poets
like Eliot are “difficult” (Urn 76-77) precisely because of their awareness of the perennial
tensions between form and content, and because of the ways they demand the reader’s
attention to this aspect of poetry: “the modern poet has, for better of worse, thrown the
weight of the responsibility on the reader” (Urn 76).
Brooks, like Eliot, maintains a distinction between reality and the poet’s creative
activity. Brooks’ concern with the differences between scientific and poetic language rest on
this distinction. The paradox – or part of it at least – is that poetry says something true about

the real, but something which cannot be expressed in the language of the real (that is, the
language of science, by which Brooks seems to mean a classical understanding of science as the
language of philosophy, theology, metaphysics, as well as the hard sciences). Poetry is
impossible to paraphrase because the way it means is through the structure of meanings or
symbols which form the body of the poem. Form and content are indistinguishable: it is
impossible to abstract the theme or idea of the poem. This is not because poems lack ideas,
that is, correlation to the real world (Urn 204-205). For Brooks, as for Warren, “the truth is
implicit in the poetic act as such” (Warren, “A Poem of Pure Imagination” 382). Rather,
abstraction is impossible because, as Eliot would put it, in making a poem the poet successfully
creates an objective correlative for his experience.
The term “objective” here is key and must be distinguished from “subjective.” A
“subject” is a thing as it stands in relation to itself; an “object” is that thing as it stands in
relation to others. Aesthetic qualities belong to objects in so far as they are objects; art is
always something “seen” by another. Brooks argues for something similar when he says that
“to know the poem as an object” is to “share in the experience” which was the catalyst for the
poem (Urn 75). To unpack this idea of poetic objectivity, it is helpful to reference John Crowe
Ransom’s triadic notion of artist-object-form, modeled after the cultural ritual triangle of manwoman-code. In that ritual triangle, when man is forced to follow the code of his people to
pursue the woman he desires: “the woman, contemplated in this manner under restraint,
becomes a person and an aesthetic object” (Ransom 33). This idea of contemplation “under
restraint” is at the heart of Ransom’s theory of poetic formalism. For Brooks too, if his more
expansive understanding of form is allowed to bear on this idea, formal restraint turns a

subject, a thing in its own right, into an object, a thing perceived by another and therefore as
aesthetic.
Before closing, I would like to consider the extent to which Brooks’ poetics, so heavily
shaped by modernism generally and by Eliot in particular, are relevant to understanding the
poets of his day. His goal in The Well Wrought Urn is to demonstrate the “common structural
properties” which make poems of all periods accessible to the critical eye (ix). Because poems
share such properties, he says, they exist and can be viewed sub specie aeternitatis (x) and have
intrinsic significance, beyond the interests of “cultural anthropology” and “political, or religious,
or moral” utility (xi). Given that this is his goal, it is particularly important to consider whether
his poetics are useful in understanding the poets of the second half of the twentieth century.
James Breslin characterizes the history of American poetry as “a series of
discontinuities, eruptions of creative energy that suddenly alienate poetry from what had come
to seem its essential and permanent nature” (xiii-xiv). He calls the shift in the late 1950s an
“antiformalist revolt” against the symbolic formalism which was the first reaction to
Modernism. What Breslin describes seems to be an ongoing dialectic in American twentieth
century poetry, a persistent tension between the poetic qualities of immediacy and formalism.
Brooks’ account of poetry as paradox and as a dynamic-dramatic working out of conflict over
time seems to agree with the ways which poets reacted to one another’s work: what happens
within the poem also happens among the poems of the century. They push with and against
one another, creating a pulsing, organic life. This dynamic pressure between poets and their
poems is what Harold Bloom describes in The Anxiety of Influence. It is helpful to remember his
claim that “strong poets make … history by misreading one another, so as to clear imaginative

space for themselves” (5). In other words, the reader must take anything which later poets say
about earlier ones with a grain of salt. They must, according to Bloom, see themselves as
distinct from their predecessors, and so may miss the important ways in which they are in
continuity with them.
Breslin further argues that the poets of the 1950s felt the need to be disruptive, and “by
way of repudiating orthodox modernism, American poetry once again became modern, ‘of the
present’” (xv). Their innovations were attempts to “breakthrough back into life” (Robert Lowell
qtd in Breslin xiv) by making poetry once again full of “temporal immediacy.” On the surface,
this account of 1950s poetry seems to contradict Brooks’ idea of poetry as sub specie
aeternitatis, but that is too simplistic a reading of both Brooks and Breslin. Brooks does not say
that poetry is without “temporal immediacy;” rather, he says that this is not its only
significance. Formal structures function to elevate experience to the objective level, but the
first requirement is that immediacy of subjective experience which underlies a poem.
Lynn Keller points to a further difference between modern and contemporary poets in
her introduction to Re-making it New:
contemporary poets differ [from modernist poets] in tending not to battle against limits
but rather to play with them, not to abhor chaos or lament the arbitrariness of order but
to accept each as intriguing possibility….Contemporary poets’ revisions of modernist
approaches thus represent a conscious critique of modernist aims and assumptions,
reflecting an altered sense of what it means for art to be close to life. (9)

Contemporary poets are interested in the “process of attention” (Keller 11) rather than on the
products of the mind which order experience: “they portray the mind engaging itself in the

world and attending to events, without imposing fixed interpretations on that experience”
(Keller 12). In certain ways, this account also seems to be in contradiction with Brooks, for
whom the form or “structures of meaning” are product rather than process. At the same time,
his principles of paradox and tension are still relevant: contemporary poets still seek to put
some kind of order on their experience. While they abandon traditional figures of rhyme and
meter even more completely than the Modernists did, contemporary poets nevertheless
employ words and space to convey meaning. And in using words, they must regulate or
structure the ways in which they want those words to connote in the reader’s mind; a choice
not to regulate them is still a choice. Poetry still, then, is a working out of some action over
time through arranged symbols.
It is less clear, however, whether Brooks’ idea of “symbolic recapitulation” and of poems
as “structures of meaning” or structures of symbols is relevant to contemporary poetry; it only
works if something slightly different is meant by “meaning.” Because contemporary poets are
so much more comfortable with post-Cartesian epistemology, with the separation between
mind and world and therefore between mind and mind, it is hard to pin down what “meaning”
actually means for them. But Vendler points to the idea of poetic resistance, which Stevens
expresses as the need to “resist the intelligence almost successfully,” as a through-line (Vendler
6). For this reason, among others, Vendler characterizes the twentieth century as “the history
of rewriting of the Modernists by their successors,” (4) a playing out on the macro-level of the
drama of poetic signification.
From this exploration of Brooks’ poetics, it is clear that his poetic theory was largely
formed by Modernism, and by Eliot and The Waste Land in particular. His ideas of paradox,

drama, and organic unity are instantiated in the recapitulating symbolism of The Waste Land.
Brooks’ fundamental idea that poetry is “a pattern of resolved stresses” (Urn 203) is universal
enough to be relevant even to contemporary poets who do away with almost every traditional
notion of poetic form. This definition of poetic form is abstract enough to permit different
kinds of “patterns” to be involved in poetic making, particularly embracing the spatial, physical
component of poetry which its oral roots often obscure. This physicality of poetry becomes the
focus of modern poets as well as the critics and poets they shape. Essentially, Brooks follows in
the Modernist tradition by expanding the possibilities for poetry while holding fast to its
transcendence: poetry can be produced in any age, so long as it is intelligible by any age.
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